DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 424 197 SP 038 145

AUTHOR Qi, Jie
TITLE Problematizing the "Taken for Granted" in Educational Issues: Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, and Michel Foucault.
PUB DATE 1997-03-26
NOTE 25p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (Chicago, IL, March 24-28, 1997).
PUB TYPE Reports - Descriptive (141) -- Speeches/Meeting Papers (150)
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Educational History; Educational Research; Elementary Secondary Education; Higher Education; Marxism; *Power Structure; Social Influences; Teaching (Occupation)
IDENTIFIERS Foucault (Michel); Gramsci (Antonio); Marx (Karl)

ABSTRACT

This paper explores how educators would raise different questions about educational issues by using Karl Marx's framework, Antonio Gramsci's conception, and Michel Foucault's notions, respectively. First, the paper compares the historical perspectives of Marx and Foucault. Marx concludes that history is a progressive linear production and that present phenomena are the result of the past. Foucault presumes that history is discontinuous and uncertain. Second, the paper analyzes differences in the notions of power presented by Marx, Gramsci, and Foucault. Marx asserts that power is a core set of conceptions (class domination and a capitalist state) and that the dominant "sovereign power" is structurally defined. Gramsci's notion of power as hegemony developed a new vocabulary for theorists. In contrast to Marxist analysis, Foucault emphasizes that power is not absolute and that "governmentality" is immersed in the modern individual. Third, regarding the issues raised from the field of education, Marxians/Gramscians tend to look at the way in which ideologies shape educational figures, while Foucauldians are more apt to examine how technologies change educational conceptions. Using Foucault's notions of history and power problematizes what has been taken for granted in the field of education and allows an examination of different questions from different perspectives. (Contains 43 references.) (Author/SM)

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ED 424 197

PROBLEMATIZING THE "TAKEN FOR GRANTED" IN EDUCATIONAL ISSUES: KARL MARX, ANTONIO GRAMSCI, AND MICHEL FOUCAULT

by Jie Qi

University of Wisconsin-Madison
Dept. of Curriculum and Instruction

E-mail: jqi@students.wisc.edu

Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Educational Research Association
March 24-28, 1997
Chicago

Session 26.31-Education Reform and Postmodern Constructions:
Theory and Practice in Mobilizing the "new" Teacher

SP038145

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explore how educators would raise different questions about educational issues by using Karl Marx's framework, Antonio Gramsci's conception and Michel Foucault's notions, respectively. First, this paper compares the historical perspectives of Marx and Foucault. Marx concludes that history is a progressive linear production, and that present phenomena are the result of the past; while Foucault presumes that history is discontinuous and uncertain. Second, this paper analyzes differences in the notions of power presented by Marx, Gramsci and Foucault. Marx asserts that power is a core set of conceptions—class domination and a capitalist state—and that the dominant "sovereign power" is structurally defined. Gramsci's notion of power as hegemony developed a new vocabulary for theorists. In contrast to Marxist analysis, Foucault, emphasizes that power is not absolute and that "governmentality" is immersed in the modern individual. Third, regarding the issues raised from the field of education, Marxians/Gramscians tend to look at the way in which ideologies shape educational figures, while Foucauldians are more apt to examine how technologies change educational conceptions.

This study will conclude by pointing out that using Foucault's notions of history and power problematizes what we have taken for granted in the field of education and allows us to ask different questions from different perspectives.

PROBLEMATIZING THE "TAKEN FOR GRANTED" IN EDUCATIONAL ISSUES: KARL MARX, ANTONIO GRAMSCI, AND MICHEL FOUCAULT

The purpose of this paper is to explore how we would raise different questions about educational issues by using Karl Marx's framework, Antonio Gramsci's conception and Michel Foucault's notions, respectively.[1] Although there have been many debates about "hot" educational issues such as multicultural education and teacher education in the United States, little attention has been given to how different theoretical approaches to analysis affect epistemological constructions in educational research. This concern is most poignant when Marxian/Gramscian educators and Foucauldian educators interpretations collide over "like" issues.

This paper does not try to define what theoretical form is "most suited" or "correct" in educational research.[2] Rather, several different positions inherent within Marx, Gramsci and Foucault are explored to help orient the educational researcher in theoretical examination. First, this paper investigates the historical perspectives between Marx and Foucault. Although many forms of analysis regard the importance of "looking back" on our history, Marx concludes that history is a progressive linear production, and the present phenomena are the result of the past; while Foucault presumes that history is discontinuous and uncertain. Second, This paper also analyzes differences in the notion of power among Marx, Gramsci and Foucault. Marx asserts that power is a core set of conceptions—class domination and a capitalist state—and that the dominant "sovereign power" is structurally defined. Gramsci's notion of power as hegemony developed a new treasury for theorists. Foucault, however, emphasizes that power is not absolute and that "governmentality" is immersed in the modern individual. Third, regarding the issues raised from the field of education, Marxians/gramscians tend to pursue how ideologies shape educational figures, while Foucauldians are more apt to examine how technologies change educational conceptions.

This study will conclude by pointing out that using Foucault's notions of history and power problematizes what we have taken for granted in the field of education and allows us to ask different questions from different perspectives.

Karl Marx's Notion of History

The essence of Marx's historical materialism is economic determinism, that is, the way in which historical existence is determined by economic patterns and laws.[3] Political formations, legal relationships, intellectual life and all ideologies are by and large determined by the material conditions of life, the mode of production. Engels

stated in *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, "The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure. . . From this point of view the final causes of all changes and political revolutions are to be sought. . . in changes in the modes of production and exchange" (pp. 700-701).

To Marx, the power of modes of production is a timeless law which determines all social relations and even the historical evolution of human societies. One of Marx's maxims is: "The relations of production of every society form a whole" (quoted in Lukacs, 1971, p. 13), in other words, all social relationships within a society are determined by the mode of production. The mode of production defines the way in which products are distributed and society is ordered, etc. Production is not a pure economic category but is, instead a "particular *economic* totality" which produces a "particular *social* totality" (Lukacs, p. 15, original emphases). Marx related this in *Capital* I: "Capitalist production, therefore, under its aspect of a continuous connected process or as a process of reproduction produces not only commodities, not only surplus value, but it also produces the capitalist relation itself, on the one hand the capitalist and on the other, the labourer" (p. 578).

According to Marx, production is understood as a law which determines every stage of social evolution. Marx divided the evolutionary process of human society into five stages: the primitive communist stage, the slave stage, the feudal stage, the capitalist stage, the socialist stage and the communist stage. Each stage has its own particular mode of production which defines human relationships. In the primitive communist stage, for example, the level of production is so low that it is impossible to produce more than needed; therefore, products are equally distributed to everyone. There are neither exploiting classes nor exploited classes. However, overproduction emerges when the level of production is increased. A few people start to exploit others' products, and therefore human society evolved to a new stage — the slave society. The production mode in the slave society determines the human relation in the slave society. Marx often insisted upon this theory. For instance: "History is the history of human industry, which undergoes growth in productive power, the stimulus and vehicle of which is an economic structure, which perishes when it has stimulated more growth than it can contain" (quoted in Cohen, 1978, p. 26).

Generally speaking, Marx considered all social phenomena to be the result of technological progress — productive forces or the mode of production of material life. Marx inquired into the production process in the first volume of *Capital*. He states: "The elementary factors of the labor-process are 1, the personal activity of man, i.e., work itself; 2, the object of the work; and 3, its instrument" (p. 117). Obviously, Marx

considered labor to be an essential factor of production.

The dialectical discourse of continuity and revolution can be found in Marx's theory of historical materialism. According to Marx, history is a continuous evolutionary process. Marx stated in *The German Ideology* (in collaboration with Engels), "History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations" (p. 57). Individuals inherit from an ongoing process of development and conform to evolution of interacting social forms.

Steven Best (1995) describes Marx's three dissimilar continuity patterns. The first is the humanist one which "interprets history as both the alienation and realization of 'human essence'" (p. 39). Marx considered the alienation of human producers apart from objective conditions of production and human essence. For Marx, history is a continuous movement composed of a two-sided process: the humanization of nature and the naturalization of humanity. The humanization of nature is "the process whereby human beings progressively enlarge the field of their objectification and gain increasing control over nature" whereas the naturalization of humanity "involves the evolution of the human being from a limited to a universal powers in a free social context" (Best, 1995, p. 39). The transformation of nature conveys the development of the production forces, whereas social-economic structures are the forms of development (Cohen, 1978). Marx and Engels indicated: "The writing of history must always be set from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of man" (1970, p. 31), and "for the socialist man, the whole of what is called world history is nothing more than the creation of man through human labor, and the development of nature for man." Labor, production and freedom are essential elements of his historical analysis.

Marx's second continuity is the productive force model which "interprets history as the progressive augmentation of the productive forces, a movement governed by the contradiction between the forces and relation of production" (Best, 1995, p. 39). Marx insisted that there is a series of models of production—tribal, ancient, feudal, capitalist and communist—each of which represents different forms of society. These types of continuity cross successive modes of production, that is, the development of the productive forces increase cumulatively from former models. Marx and Engels proclaimed in *The German Ideology*, that "at each stage there is found a material result: a sum of productive forces, a historically created relation of individuals to nature and to another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and conditions" (p. 59); and products in each epoch are "the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing

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on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, modifying its social system according to the changed needs" (p. 62). Namely, what human beings possess in the present has been generated by human activities in the past. The past continues through present activities. At each moment human beings transcend the past and reproduce it. This productive development structures historical continuity:

> Because of this simple fact that succeeding generation finds itself in possession of the productive forces acquired by the previous generation, which serve it as the raw material for new production, a coherence arises in human history, a history of humanity takes shape which is all the more a history of humanity as the productive force of man and therefore his social relations have been developed." (Marx, Engels, 1975, p. 30).

The third model of continuity, class struggle, "interprets historical change as resulting from the struggles between contending class" (Best, 1995, p. 39). As Marx stated at the beginning of the *Communist Manifesto*, "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles," the writing of all history is interpreted from the viewpoint of class struggle. To Marx, class is a group of people who find themselves in the same social-political-economical condition. Marx and Engels wrote at the beginning of the *Communist Manifesto* that, "Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman—in a word, oppressor and oppressed—stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended either in revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes." Class structure existed since slave society, and capitalism represents the continuity of all previous societies. It is also "the last antagonistic form of the process of production" and a preparation of producing "the prehistory of human society" (Marx, 1978, cited in Best, 1995, p. 42). According to Marx, communism puts an end to class society and commences a class-free history.

Nevertheless, Marx's historical materialism, at the same time, contains a series of social and political revolutions. Relations of production or property relations are in accord with forces of production. However, when the model of production changes, this harmony disappears and revolution is the only way to solve the vehement conflict and to create new property relations in harmony with the new mode of production. As Marx and Engels argued:

> The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instrument of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. (1978, p. 476)

Thus, the capitalist society is not a break from previous societies but rather the culmination of all preceding models of production.

Marx emphasizes the different character of bourgeois revolution and proletarian revolution, that is, bourgeois revolution and proletarian revolution have different concerns about the role of property relations. On the one hand, "bourgeois revolution consists primarily of adjusting political institutions to a changed economic systems"; on the other hand, "proletarian revolution consists primarily in adjusting both political and economic institutions to a changed technology" (Moore, 1980, p. 224).

Although Marx's revolutionary theory seems to be a historical break, Marx's revolution is predicable in history. Marx's theory does not allow for historical contingency. As we have explored earlier, Marx believed that each revolution is caused by the developed production mode. To Marx, revolution is part of a historically continuous evolution and a step in the progress of history.

In sum, Marx's conception of historical materialism throws some light on certain phases of human history and helps us to understand the different epochs of social development. However, it has its own limitations in some aspects. Due to its extreme focus on production, Marx's historical perspective ignores other dynamics which can change history. For example, Marx neglected cultural functions which can be an element in changing history as well. A Marxist theory of history could not have explained the "democratic" uprising of Tien An men in May 1989. According to Marx, this type of revolution has no theoretical "cause" because a socialist state should not "cause" revolution. Perhaps we need to ask ourselves the question of whether Marx's theory of history "is a key that fits many locks but opens few doors" (Bober, 1927, p. 428).

Foucault's Notion of History

The essential feature of Foucault's notion of history is genealogy—a history of

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the present which is, generally speaking, intended to demonstrate that there is nothing necessary or inevitable about the present circumstances.[4] The objective of genealogy is to historicize the subject, that is, to demonstrate that events and circumstances are historically contingent. As Foucault (1976) indicates, genealogy "is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledge against the claims of unitary body of theory...." As such it "allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today" (p. 83). Further, Foucault asserts in his later work that:

> One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself . . . to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of subjects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history (1984, p. 59).

Foucault's notion of genealogy, as Popkewitz and Brennan (1997) have pointed out clearly, is to "construct historical analyses about how the particular forms of reasoning and 'telling the truth' of the present involved shifts in the power relations and kinds of knowledge central to establishing a particular discourse" (p. 9). Genealogy, as one of the "linguistic turns" represented in the social sciences, emphasizes the analysis of discourse. For Foucault, human beings use language to transmit their thoughts, but what human beings think is not free of linguistic impositions, and the meaning of the language is historically and socially constructed. Human beings' speech "is language historically formed and then brought into the present" (Popkewitz, 1997, p. 147). The analysis of discourse allows us to pursue at a given moment and to "understand the conditions in which knowledge is produced" (Popkewitz & Brennan, 1997, p. 4). Discourse has influenced Foucault's analyses of institutions, such as the prison or the asylum (see, e.g., O'Brien, 1989). According to Foucault, madness, for example, has carried different meanings at different historical period and in different societies. As Foucault (1972) says: ". . . in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed. . . ." (p. 216)

In Foucault's sense, genealogy is a method of problematizing the "nature" of what we have become and expose that which appears "natural" as a social and historical construct. It allows us to ask different questions about the status quo with the hope of bringing about a particular kind of analysis that may shed light on how knowledge has been produced by historical power relations, and how we have come to

be "ourselves" in the present.

A history of the present does not mean "writing history of the past in terms of the present", but it "means writing the history of the present" (Foucault, 1977, p. 31). Some scholars, such as Robert Castel, have mis-interpreted "a history of the present" as the consideration of "the history of a problem in terms of how it is seen at present" (Castel, 1995, p. 238). Moreover, Castel admonishes that "historians have reason to be particularly wary of the temptation to rewrite history on the basis of contemporary interests" (p. 239). Here, Castel is advising against reinterpreting history or allowing the writing of history to be influenced to some degree by the circumstances, for example, the social-political-economic situation in existence at the time when it is being written. He need not be concerned about this issue with regards to Foucault's history because Foucault's intention is to problematize historical and social constructions, not to "reinterpret" or "revise" history to be accessible to contemporary sensibilities.

The History of Sexuality, for example, explores how bourgeois sexuality has been produced by different powers and technologies, and how it has shifted over time. Foucault's intention is not to write a continuous history of desire, or of pleasure. As he says in *The Use of Pleasure*, "what I planned, therefore, was a history of the experience of sexuality, where experience is understood as the correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture" (p. 4). In writing his history, Foucault wanted to undermine the common belief that sexuality was a constant. Through inscribing different powers and technologies, such as Christian confession, state regulation and institutional discipline, Foucault maps a triangular relationship between sexuality, power and knowledge/truth. Power produces knowledge/truth, and "is above all a relation of force" (Foucault, 1976, p. 89). At the same time sexuality depends on the produced knowledge/truth.

Thus, the purpose of writing *The History of Sexuality* for Foucault is to deconstruct the "nature" of sexuality conceived by individuals, and "to understand how the modern individual could experience himself as a subject of a 'sexuality,' it was essential first to determine how, for centuries, Western man had been brought to recognize himself as a subject of desire" (Foucault, 1985, pp. 5-6). For Foucault, writing history is for the present. Through historicizing the notion of "nature", we could recognize how we have become what we are and learn how to problematize what we have taken as natural in education, bilingual education and teacher education.

Although Foucault's notion of history offers a history of the present, it refuses to offer any vision of the future. Foucault is often called and even has called himself

a pessimist. Foucault indicates that history is discontinuous and contingent, and history does not repeat itself. Some scholars, such as Rorty, have criticized that the use of Foucault's notion of history can not inscribe any bright future. Rorty mutters (1982): if we can not suggest "how our children might inhabit a better world"(p.17), why do we bother to recount history? Here, what I would like to say is that there is no absolute truth from which the present derives. Recounting past events, however, may hint as to how we have come to the present condition. In Chinese, "the day before yesterday" can be translated as "the days in the front of us" because the Chinese think they have already seen those days, while Chinese people use "the days in the back" to mean "the day after tomorrow" because we have not seen and do not know what will happen.[5]

Foucault's notion of history provides us with skepticism. It recognizes that everything is dangerous. Prescribing the future is also dangerous. Using Foucault's notion of history allows us to ask different questions about "nature" which we have conceived with a particular kind of analysis that may shed some light on how we have come to the present and how the present is historically and socially constructed, but it stops short of offering predictions about or visions of the future. In this way, neither past nor future can be viewed as (pre)determined.

Marx's Notion of Power

Power, for Marx was an ideological issue, and power could be possessed. Marx's theory of power employed a core set of concepts: class domination and a capitalist state. First, Marx argued that "the individual is a being only in and through society", and stated that society is classified (Marx & Engels, 1978, p. 83). According to Marx's analysis of capitalist society, the individual's social circumstances, e.g., the difference of property and money, determine the individual's membership in a certain class. In other words, classes are determined by position within the process of production and the possession of products. Lenin wrote a famous annotation on Marx's conception of class:

> Classes are large groups of people which differ from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labor and, consequently, by the dimensions and method of acquiring the share of social wealth of which they dispose. Classes are groups of people, one of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places they hold in a definite system of social economy" (1947, p. 492).

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Capital and labor were Marx's two basic classifications for capitalist society. The capitalist class has economic power which can be divided into two types: the power of control over investment and the power to supervise the labor process. The relation between capital and labor is a relation of domination and subordination.

Domination is a perpetual characteristic of class relations and is reproduced in the practices of production. As Marx indicated: "If the capitalist mode of production presupposes this definite social form of the conditions of production, so does it reproduce it continually. It produces not merely the material products, but reproduces continually the production relations in which the former are produced, and thereby also the corresponding distribution relation" (1967, p. 879). The domination and subordination of the capital-labor power relation, therefore, is fixed. Moreover, domination involves exploitation: a) the capitalist minimizes costs in the interests of profitability; and b) the capitalist places minimal value on workers' skills and knowledge in order to curtail workers' wages.

The capitalist state as well, makes up an important part of Marx's power issue. It possesses the political power. Marx defined the subject of the state as: "an organization of the possessing class for its protection against the nonpossessing class" (cited in Tucker, 1972, p. 127). The state represents the interests of a few of those people, the capitalist class. The power of the state is not used in the general interests, but it is used to repress the struggles of the labor class, and to protect the interests of the bourgeoisie. Marx expressed the relationship between state, capitalist and labor in *Civil War in France:*

> At the same time pace at which the progress of modern industry developed, widened, intensified the class antagonism between capital and labor, the State power assumed more and more the character of national power of capital over labor, of a public force organized for social enslavement, of an engine of class despotism. . . . [The bourgeoisie] uses that State power mercilessly and ostentatiously as the national war-engine of capital against labor (p. 552).

The capitalist operates the state as an embodiment of a special class of governors of society's power: politicians, bureaucracy, standing army and police. As Marx pointed out: "by the word 'state' is meant the government machine, or the state insofar as it forms a special organism separated from society through the division of labor. . . ." (cited in Tucker, 1972, p. 127).

Thus, in Marx's scheme, the state in concert with capitalists represses proletarian forces and promotes the exploiting class, the ruling class. At the same time, "the 'ruling class' of capitalist society is that class which owns and controls the

means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state as an instrument for the domination of society" (Miliband, 1969, p. 146).

Since Marx considered power existing in the dominant class, the individual proletarian alone is powerless. "Collective emancipation cannot come through a series of individual exist, but only collectively, through the exercise of class power" (Cohen, 1978, p. 243). Marx advanced that proletarians have to unite against the capitalists in order to emancipate all proletarian classes.

Marx's notion of power has both strengths and limitations. First, Marx looked at power as an outside effect, specifically stemming from class power. In exploring domination, power was not seen in terms of relation between the dominant and the dominated but primarily in terms of "who dominates whom" and "who has power". In turn, Marx did not deal with the logic of the culture of the dominated as well as he does for the dominant. Second, although more recent neo-Marxist writings include many cultural aspects, Marx's own emphasis on class power excluded race and gender. The exclusion of race and gender hinders a complete examination of the cultural phase in that it reduces the scope of culture to a narrower notion of class culture. "Power is not strongest when it uses violence, but weakest. It is strongest when it employs the instruments of substitution and counter attraction, of allurement, of participation rather than of exclusion, of education rather than of annihilation" (Merriam, 1964, p. 179). Third, Marx's power issue is theoretically locked in the concept of class. Marx did not suggest how the proletariat could be empowered. As I will discuss in the following section, Gramsci's notion of hegemony contributes to the empowerment of the proletariat.

Gramsci and Hegemony: Beyond Marx's Notion of Power

From the turn of the century onward, many Marxist theorists have made strenuous efforts to interpret or develop Marx's theory. Among these neo-Marxists, Antonio Gramsci is prominent for his notion of hegemony which is an anti-economic problematic of ideology.[6] Gramsci argues that "changing socio-economic circumstances do not of themselves 'produce' political changes", that "the 'relations of force' pertaining at the political level, the degree of political organization and combativity of the opposing forces, the strength of the political alliances which they manage to bind together and their level of political consciousness, of preparation of the struggle on the ideological terrain" bring about changes (Forgacs, in Gramsci, 1988, p. 190).

In Gramsci's conception, hegemony is a complete fusion of political, intellectual and moral leadership which brings groups together through the intermediary of ideology when an ideology manages to "spread throughout the whole of society

determining not only united economic and political objectives but also intellectual and moral unity" (Gramsci, cited in Mouffe, 1979, p. 181). Influence, leadership, culture, ideology and organization are all involved. For Gramsci, hegemony is not a domination by means of force, but a consent by means of political and intellectual leadership, that is, this leadership is over those groups who consent to be led. Furthermore, Gramsci's hegemony goes beyond economic problems:

> Previously germinated ideologies become "party", come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society — bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a "universal" plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group [the proletariat] over a series of subordinate groups (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 181-2).

Gramsci's hegemony is developed for the working class in its struggle for socialism. The working class takes account the interests of other class and social forces and combines them with its own interests in order to develop into a hegemonic class. Workers have to learn to think and act like a ruling class. Before they hold state power, the working class must have the ability of being a ruling class in the political, cultural and ethical sense (Cammett, 1967).

Hegemony opposes passive revolution. Gramsci considers the state a legitimated hegemony. Passive revolution is a coup d'etat because it is accomplished without establishing the social and political pattern of existing power relations. For him, the state is an integration of force and consent. A social group achieves a lasting rule over society only by instilling dominant culture and moral beliefs in the consciousness of the people (Fontana, 1993). In the case of the state, hegemony is a strategy for acquiring active consent from people by creating a collective political will. This anti-passive revolution of thought is the most creative and distinctive development of Gramsci's theory. Gramsci indicates that workers and the workers' party need to "think themselves into historical autonomy, without which no permanent revolution is possible" (William, 1975, p. 183). In a sense, Gramsci's view of peoples' participation in the very power relations which control them resembles Foucault's vision of governmentality. In both cases, the individual is responsible for self-governance.

Gramsci's neo-Marxism and the terms in which he reintroduces the conception of social relations of production indicates how to reach a superior cultural and social

unity in terms of the ethico-political analysis:

> Philosophical activity is not to be conceived solely as the "individual" elaboration of systematically coherent concepts, but also and above all as a cultural battle to transform the "popular mentality and to diffuse the philosophical innovations which will demonstrate themselves to be "historically true" to the extent that they become concretely - i.e. historically and socially - universal (Gramsci, cited in Mouffe, 1979, p. 145).

Intellectuals play a leading part in this philosophical activity. Gramsci regards intellectuals as both disseminators and producers of a certain set of knowledge and values and suppressors of others. Intellectuals are the organizers and educators of society. They guarantee that the existing power structure will be accepted by both allied and subordinate groups. Gramsci's notion of hegemony has become the main resource for critical theorists. Especially, in the field of education, many educators insist on applying the notion of hegemony to their discussion. I will question this in the last section of this paper.

Even though critical theorists generally consider Gramsci's theory to be Marxist, there are aspects of Gramsci's notion of power which are more like Foucault's than like Marx's. Gramsci does not consider power as residing in a class or structure as Marx believes. Gramsci's notion of hegemony and Foucault's notion of governmentality both recognize the role of individual in self-governance. However, Gramsci's notion of the role of individual is quite different from Foucault's. Gramsci believes that the intellectual should lead people. Foucault, on the other hand, puts the intellectual in a much more humble and modest position by recognizing the potential for danger in all regimes.

Foucault's Notion of Power

Power composes a very important part of Foucault's entire work. For him, power is neither an ideological concern, nor a domain dominated by one social group over others, but rather exercised. It can be seen in what he declares in *The History of Sexuality*:

> By power , I do not mean "Power" as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination

> exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivation, pervade the entire social body....It seem to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunction and contradictions which isolate them from one another.... (p. 92)

Foucault asserts that one should analyze power not by its central locations, as regulated and legitimated forms, but at the level of "those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviors" (Foucault, 1986, p. 233). For Foucault, power is not a possession but something that only exists in action. A multiplicity of actions engenders power, and power operates through discourse associated with the construct of knowledge. Discourse produces power, power produces knowledge, and power is a productive network all over the society. Knowledge is always reshaped and reconstructed when power relations change.

Through some of Foucault's work, such as *The History of Sexuality, Discipline and Punish* or other later essays, we can find two emergent types of power: sovereign power and disciplinary power. Each of these powers was involved in particular configurations of the state and the society. First, sovereign power, the traditional power, is connected with the territorial state, the society of laws. Its characteristic is the interplay of regulation and obligation. Second, disciplinary power is exercised through institutions, such as schools, armies or factories. This type of power serves the administrative state and regulates society. Foucault has pointed out: a) modern power is the co-existence of sovereign and disciplinary power; and b) this co-existence hides the actual mechanism of discipline, surveillance and coercion.

Governmentality is a technique of disciplinary power, and is an art of governing. It is a regime which is dedicated to the management of population and the economy, and it is identified with the governmental state and with "a type of society controlled by apparatuses of security" (Foucault, 1991, p. 104). According to Foucault, governmentality first emerged in the eighteenth century in France. Unlike the previous administrative state which resorted to controlling its geographic territory, the governmental state engaged upon introducing economy into political practice. As Foucault (1991) says: "To govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of each and all. . . ." (p. 92). The concern for population became crucial to the governmental state. Population was seen through

the "grid of politically or administratively identified regularities in the natural phenomena and processes affecting relation between individual living beings coexisting within a general system of living beings. . . " (Burchell, 1991, p. 126). Foucault has defined the term of governmentality: "This contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self I call governmentality" (Foucault, 1988, p. 19).

In the governmental state, individuals are not only the target or object of government. The relationship between governing and governed is a dual one. Individual are the governed subjects, but at the same time they are the partners of the government. Individuals become "the correlate and instrument" of the governmental state (Burchell, 1991, p. 127). On the one hand, the state outlines a possible art of government which reckons on numerous techniques for disciplining individuals to be rational citizens. Conducting health, hygiene and education, for example, are techniques of reasoning citizens. On the other hand, individuals have shifted from rationally-governed subjects to spontaneous problem-solvers, that is, they practice the appropriate forms of "technologies of the self". Individuals are at once governed by others and are involved in the practices of self-governing. They also send messages of what is reasonable governors for them and how they want to be governed to the governmental state through public-opinion polls or elections.

Governmentality is diffused throughout modern society. It produces knowledge/truth through multifarious social institutions and experts, at a distance in both constitutional and spatial senses. In the beginning of the twentieth century, in the United States and some European countries, social reform movements were prominent. A crucial link in the changing patterns of social organization was the professionalization of knowledge. The governments of these countries have been relying on the research of experts, especially psychologists, to gather support for the new policies. The new technique of governing is governing at a distance is, as Robert Castel (1991) says, "a system of prevention perfect enough to dispense with both repression and assistance, thanks to its capability to forward-plan social trajectories from a 'scientific' evaluation of individual abilities" (p. 296).

Specialists, especially psychologists, are perfect mediators of government. These experts have changed the way of raising children and other aspects of people's daily behavior in order to make people become ideal and rational citizens. Such examples can be seen from what Nikolas Rose (1994) has explained:

> On one hand, doctors, psychologists, health visitors and others would grid the family and its activities with new ways of visualizing and judging childhood and children, in which normality would become simultaneously that which was

natural and that which was to be safeguarded and produced through the knowledgeable management of child-rearing by the ordinary mother surrounded by the experts who she can and will trust. On the other hand around the problem family, experts would seek to mobilize the power of the state in order to realize the dream of a rationalized and comprehensive system of services exercising a continuous educational scrutiny over the potentially dangerous household" (p. 377).

Such knowledge tends to be proven scientifically. It sinks deeply into the populace's mind through propaganda, mass media and so on. It also crosses national boundaries and has become globalized. For example, "to be healthy", is the motif of life in almost all nations in the world. Governmentality is the economy of normalizing people in the society. The issue of power is critical in using Foucault's notion of history. Foucauldian historians would need to broaden their analysis of power from concern with the sovereign state in relation to society, and to show how power is exercised within society by individuals and groups.

Although many Foucauldians, like Nikolas Rose, consider that Foucault's analysis of power, especially governmentality, helps them understand power relations in the modern society, Foucault's analysis of power may be criticized for "one without liberal hope or comfort" (Hiley, 1984, p. 194). Foucault has mentioned this in a interview with Deleuze: "The intellectual's role is no longer to place himself 'somewhat ahead and to the side' in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of 'knowledge,' 'truth,' 'consciousness,' and 'discourse.'" (p. 208).

Influences of Marx, Gramsci and Foucault on Education

Marx, Gramsci and Foucault have influenced the educational discourse. There have been many debates about schools among Marxian/Gramscian educators and Foucauldian educators. Generally, Marxian/Gramscian educators criticize schooling in capitalist society as a form of injustice. Marx's conception of capitalist production—the capitalist production produces both commodities and capital-labor relation—is a weapon for Marxian/Gramscian educators' inquiry. Marxian/Gramscian educators, such as Giroux early work (1981), have reduced the concept of ideology either to the logic of domination or to a method of inquiry designed to uncover how domination works in the interest of capitalist rationality.

Moreover, although there are diverse visions of Marxian/Gramscian educators, the majority of them consider that there is a continuity in the history of producing

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unjust schooling. Apple (1990) explains that the reproduction of hegemony has existed since the turn of the century when the rationale of school took on the language of efficiency and control to provide a false sense of neutrality. He argues that there is a line in curriculum history from Thorndike, Bobbitt and Tyler to the present. They strived to search for a neutral methodology, and the continuing transformation of the field into a neutral instrumentation in the service of structurally non-neutral interests served to hide the political and economic injustice in education.

Unlike Marxian educators, Foucauldian educators have argued that technologies construct schooling. Ian Hunter in *Rethinking the School: Subjectivity, Bureaucracy, Criticism* displays a large number of technologies which have changed the notion of schooling since the nineteenth century. Various technologies, such as statistical surveys, IQ tests, spiritual disciplines of pastoral guidance and philosophical critiques have shaped the characteristics of the school system. The development of IQ tests, for example, was a technique for bureaucrats and the experts to manage the school population. According to Hunter, these bureaucrats considered IQ as a way to question the divisions of schooling, and to value the equality of outcome more than the equality of opportunity; they knew that IQ was about students' adaptation to the school environment but not about their innate intelligence.

Hunter provides us with a Foucauldian notion of governmentality. The production of systems of schooling involved a complexity of power relations. Bureaucracies and the nationwide governmental requirements played a role in school system development. At the same time, a variety of internal "self-surveillance" and disciplines were a part of schooling modes. Furthermore, Hunter argues that all these technologies are historical contingencies which come together to constitute the school system.

In the discourse of multicultural education, Foucauldian educators tend to be aware that it is dangerous to assume all members of a nation or an ethnic group would behave in the same way. They problematize the definition of "culture" itself: "Culture is not a static concept but is a dynamic process, being formed by its carriers as well as received from cultural transmitters. . . . Culture is. . .always in need of discovery rather than being describable for all members of a group in advance of knowledge any specific individual members and the particular sociocultural contexts in which they enact their cultural identities or behavior " (Tabachhnick & Bloch, 1995, p. 205). Culture is not fixed, ordered, and unchangeable.

In sum, Marxian/Gramscian educators and Foucauldian educators have taken very different opinions on considering schooling. On the one hand, Marxian/Gramscian educators view the school as a continuing reproduction of unfair and unjust institutions, and assert that ideology shapes schooling. Foucauldian educators, on the

other hand, argue that the notion of schooling is contingently constructed and reconstructed by various technologies.

Conclusion

As I have explored, there are many differences among Marx's, Gramsci's and Foucault's theories. Regarding history, Marx believes that human being's history is determined by economic patterns and laws, and that the present phenomena are the result of the past, whereas Foucault's notion of history is discontinuous and uncertain and nothing is necessary or inevitable about the present circumstances. For Marx, power is an ideological issue; power is a set of conceptions—class domination and a capitalist state— and that the dominant "sovereign power" is structurally defined. Gramsci, however, asserts that hegemony is the way to empower proletariat. For Foucault, power is neither an ideological concern, nor a domain dominated by one social group over others, but rather exerted; governmentality is an art of government and it is diffused throughout modern society.

Foucault's notions of history and power provide us with a skepticism. Nothing is absolute. History does not repeat itself. Power, knowledge and truth change over time. Moreover, they problematize what we have taken for granted. The "nature" which we have conceived is socially and historically constructed. Using Foucault's notion allows us to ask different questions about the status quo with a particular kind of analysis that may shed some light on how we have come to the present. Foucault seems to tell us that "you are not free". On the assumption that we are not free, we are compelled to continually ask the questions: what makes us not free and is it possible to be "free"?

Endnotes

1 Marxism was "natural" to me. I was born in the People's Republic of China and grew up there. It is no exaggeration to say that all the "cells" of my body were "red Marxist" although the Marxist in China might be the particular Chinese interpretation of Karl Marx's theory. When I started my graduate studies in the United States one and a half years ago, I had the chance to read Foucault's work. Since then, many conflicts between Marx and Foucault have remained in my mind. This is one reason why I am doing this "unhistorical" comparative studies between Marx and Foucault.

2 Because of the nature of comparative studies, it is hard to be completely neutral since I believe that people already locate themselves when they start to speak. I do not think I could possibly not fall into this trap, that is, I do not believe that I could be perfectly neutral.

3 Marx's historical materialism seems to be break from Hegel's notion of materialism. For reference, see G. Cohen (1978), *Karl Marx's theory of history*, and S. Avineri (1972), The Hegelian origins of Marx's thought.

4 Foucault borrows the term of genealogy from Nietzsche. Although many have said that the Foucault's notion of history is similar to Nietzsche, I assert that Foucault's notion of history is a rupture from Nietzsche. For reference, see Foucault(1984), Nietzsche, genealogy, history.

5 I appreciate Lynn Fendler for pointing out this so clearly. Speaking Chinese as a foreign language, she problematized what I had taken for granted as a native speaker.

6 Gramsci's notion of hegemony is completely different from Lenin's. For Lenin, hegemony was a strategy for revolution. See, e.g., R. Simon (1982), *Gramsci's political thought: An introduction*.

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